I've been reading various articles and statements on the
Naturalism.org website recently, and I have found that they express my
own worldview rather well.  For instance,  here's a summary of the
tenets of naturalism.  Comments anyone?


Tenets of Naturalism

 What exists: This version of naturalism asserts that the world is of
a piece; everything we are and do is included in the space-time
continuum whose most basic elements are those described by physics. We
are the evolved products of natural selection, which operates without
intention, foresight or purpose. Nothing about us escapes being
included in the physical universe, or escapes being shaped by the
various processes – physical, biological, psychological, and social –
that science describes. On a scientific understanding of ourselves,
there’s no evidence for immaterial souls, spirits, mental essences, or
disembodied selves which stand apart from the physical world.

What constitutes knowledge: Naturalism as a worldview is based on the
premise that knowledge about what exists and about how things work is
best achieved through the sciences, not personal revelation or
religious tradition. The knowledge we have of ourselves and our place
in nature is the achievement of a collective effort to construct a
consistent view of the world that permits prediction and control. This
effort proceeds by experiment and rational inquiry, and the knowledge
gained is always subject to further testing as understanding matures.
Wanting something to be true, or having the intense personal
conviction that something is true, are never grounds for supposing
that it is true.  Scientific empiricism has the necessary consequence
of unifying our knowledge of the world, of placing all objects of
understanding within an overarching causal context. Under naturalism,
there is a single, natural world in which phenomena arise.

The causal view: From a naturalistic perspective, there are no
causally privileged agents, nothing that causes without being caused
in turn.  Human beings act the way they do because of the various
influences that shape them, whether these be biological or social,
genetic or environmental. We do not have the capacity to act outside
the causal connections that link us in every respect to the rest of
the world. This means we do not have what many people think of as free
will, being able to cause our behavior without our being fully caused
in turn.

The self: As strictly physical beings, we don’t exist as immaterial
selves, either mental or spiritual, that control behavior. Thought,
desires, intentions, feelings, and actions all arise on their own
without the benefit of a supervisory self, and they are all the
products of a physical system, the brain and the body. The self is
constituted by more or less consistent sets of personal
characteristics, beliefs, and actions; it doesn’t exist apart from
those complex physical processes that make up the individual. It may
strongly seem as if there is a self sitting behind experience,
witnessing it, and behind behavior, controlling it, but this
impression is strongly disconfirmed by a scientific understanding of
human behavior.

Responsibility and morality: From a naturalistic perspective, behavior
arises out of the interaction between individuals and their
environment, not from a freely willing self that produces behavior
independently of causal connections (see above). Therefore individuals
don’t bear ultimate originative responsibility for their actions, in
the sense of being their first cause. Given the circumstances both
inside and outside the body, they couldn’t have done other than what
they did. Nevertheless, we must still hold individuals responsible, in
the sense of applying rewards and sanctions, so that their behavior
stays more or less within the range of what we deem acceptable. This
is, partially, how people learn to act ethically. Naturalism doesn’t
undermine the need or possibility of responsibility and morality, but
it places them within the world as understood by science. However,
naturalism does call into question the basis for retributive
attitudes, namely the idea that individuals could have done otherwise
in the situation in which their behavior arose and so deeply deserve
punishment.

The source of value: Because naturalism doubts the existence of
ultimate purposes either inherent in nature or imposed by a creator,
values derive from human needs and desires, not supernatural
absolutes. Basic human values are widely shared by virtue of being
rooted in our common evolved nature. We need not appeal to a
supernatural standard of ethical conduct to know that in general it’s
wrong to lie, cheat, steal, rape, murder, torture, or otherwise treat
people in ways we’d rather not be treated. Our naturally endowed
empathetic concern for others and our hard-wired penchant for
cooperation and reciprocity get us what we most want as social
creatures: to flourish as individuals within a community. Naturalism
may show the ultimate contingency of some values, in that human nature
might have evolved differently and human societies and political
arrangements might have turned out otherwise. But, given who and what
we are as natural creatures, we necessarily find ourselves with shared
basic values which serve as the criteria for assessing moral dilemmas,
even if these assessments are sometimes fiercely contested and in some
cases never quite resolved.

http://www.naturalism.org/tenetsof.htm

On 25 Aug, 20:22, Dave Smith  wrote:
> I've been reading various articles and statements on the
> Naturalism.org website recently, and I have found that they express my
> own worldview rather well.  For instance,  here's a summary of the
> tenets of naturalism.  Comments anyone?
>
> Tenets of Naturalism
>
>  What exists: This version of naturalism asserts that the world is of
> a piece; everything we are and do is included in the space-time
> continuum whose most basic elements are those described by physics. We
> are the evolved products of natural selection, which operates without
> intention, foresight or purpose. Nothing about us escapes being
> included in the physical universe, or escapes being shaped by the
> various processes – physical, biological, psychological, and social –
> that science describes. On a scientific understanding of ourselves,
> there’s no evidence for immaterial souls, spirits, mental essences, or
> disembodied selves which stand apart from the physical world.
>
> What constitutes knowledge: Naturalism as a worldview is based on the
> premise that knowledge about what exists and about how things work is
> best achieved through the sciences, not personal revelation or
> religious tradition. The knowledge we have of ourselves and our place
> in nature is the achievement of a collective effort to construct a
> consistent view of the world that permits prediction and control. This
> effort proceeds by experiment and rational inquiry, and the knowledge
> gained is always subject to further testing as understanding matures.
> Wanting something to be true, or having the intense personal
> conviction that something is true, are never grounds for supposing
> that it is true.  Scientific empiricism has the necessary consequence
> of unifying our knowledge of the world, of placing all objects of
> understanding within an overarching causal context. Under naturalism,
> there is a single, natural world in which phenomena arise.
>
> The causal view: From a naturalistic perspective, there are no
> causally privileged agents, nothing that causes without being caused
> in turn.  Human beings act the way they do because of the various
> influences that shape them, whether these be biological or social,
> genetic or environmental. We do not have the capacity to act outside
> the causal connections that link us in every respect to the rest of
> the world. This means we do not have what many people think of as free
> will, being able to cause our behavior without our being fully caused
> in turn.
>
> The self: As strictly physical beings, we don’t exist as immaterial
> selves, either mental or spiritual, that control behavior. Thought,
> desires, intentions, feelings, and actions all arise on their own
> without the benefit of a supervisory self, and they are all the
> products of a physical system, the brain and the body. The self is
> constituted by more or less consistent sets of personal
> characteristics, beliefs, and actions; it doesn’t exist apart from
> those complex physical processes that make up the individual. It may
> strongly seem as if there is a self sitting behind experience,
> witnessing it, and behind behavior, controlling it, but this
> impression is strongly disconfirmed by a scientific understanding of
> human behavior.
>
> Responsibility and morality: From a naturalistic perspective, behavior
> arises out of the interaction between individuals and their
> environment, not from a freely willing self that produces behavior
> independently of causal connections (see above). Therefore individuals
> don’t bear ultimate originative responsibility for their actions, in
> the sense of being their first cause. Given the circumstances both
> inside and outside the body, they couldn’t have done other than what
> they did. Nevertheless, we must still hold individuals responsible, in
> the sense of applying rewards and sanctions, so that their behavior
> stays more or less within the range of what we deem acceptable. This
> is, partially, how people learn to act ethically. Naturalism doesn’t
> undermine the need or possibility of responsibility and morality, but
> it places them within the world as understood by science. However,
> naturalism does call into question the basis for retributive
> attitudes, namely the idea that individuals could have done otherwise
> in the situation in which their behavior arose and so deeply deserve
> punishment.
>
> The source of value: Because naturalism doubts the existence of
> ultimate purposes either inherent in nature or imposed by a creator,
> values derive from human needs and desires, not supernatural
> absolutes. Basic human values are widely shared by virtue of being
> rooted in our common evolved nature. We need not appeal to a
> supernatural standard of ethical conduct to know that in general it’s
> wrong to lie, cheat, steal, rape, murder, torture, or otherwise treat
> people in ways we’d rather not be treated. Our naturally endowed
> empathetic concern for others and our hard-wired penchant for
> cooperation and reciprocity get us what we most want as social
> creatures: to flourish as individuals within a community. Naturalism
> may show the ultimate contingency of some values, in that human nature
> might have evolved differently and human societies and political
> arrangements might have turned out otherwise. But, given who and what
> we are as natural creatures, we necessarily find ourselves with shared
> basic values which serve as the criteria for assessing moral dilemmas,
> even if these assessments are sometimes fiercely contested and in some
> cases never quite resolved.
>
> http://www.naturalism.org/tenetsof.htm

It's the last bit I question. It seems clear that some folk don't
share the values you'd expect.

On Aug 25, 9:22 pm, Dave Smith  wrote:
>
I can't find any objections come to mind.
>
> The source of value: Because naturalism doubts the existence of
> ultimate purposes either inherent in nature or imposed by a creator,
> values derive from human needs and desires, not supernatural
> absolutes. Basic human values are widely shared by virtue of being
> rooted in our common evolved nature. We need not appeal to a
> supernatural standard of ethical conduct to know that in general it’s
> wrong to lie, cheat, steal, rape, murder, torture, or otherwise treat
> people in ways we’d rather not be treated. Our naturally endowed
> empathetic concern for others and our hard-wired penchant for
> cooperation and reciprocity get us what we most want as social
> creatures: to flourish as individuals within a community. Naturalism
> may show the ultimate contingency of some values, in that human nature
> might have evolved differently and human societies and political
> arrangements might have turned out otherwise. But, given who and what
> we are as natural creatures, we necessarily find ourselves with shared
> basic values which serve as the criteria for assessing moral dilemmas,
> even if these assessments are sometimes fiercely contested and in some
> cases never quite resolved.
>
I think that it's a mistake to believe that all ethical questions can,
or should, necessarily have resolutions. It's that form of thinking
that leads to the notion of 'drawing lines' - that is coming to
arbitrary conclusions for the sake of easy legal applicability and
then, abstracting from that the idea that acting away from these is
immoral.

It's clear that sex with children is wrong. It's not clear that sex
with somebody the day before or after their 16th birthday is more or
less wrong. The question of exactly when somebody ceases to be a child
is a wrong question - it depends on so many things, particularly the
person. The reification of the idea of a 'child' is part of the
problem, it's perfectly possible for the same person to be a 'child'
in one circumstance, and at the same time, an adult in another or even
in the same circumstance at a different time. The basic value remains
the same for everybody, but most moral dilemmas based on this are not
dilemmas at all, but, rather, silly questions that miss the point -
only a consideration of a particular real case based on the essential
values, will yield up a reasonable answer.

On 25 Aug, 23:15, sdm_sax  wrote:

> It's the last bit I question. It seems clear that some folk don't
> share the values you'd expect.

Our values presumably reflect our biology, development and current
circumstances, so there are bound to be individual differences.
However, there is much common ground within groups and even between
groups, as regards, for instance, violence, theft, sharing resources,
sexual taboos, co-operation, and so on.  If there was no common
ground, wouldn't moral debate be pointless?

Dave Smith

On 26 Aug, 05:44, Peter Brooks  wrote:

> I think that it's a mistake to believe that all ethical questions can,
> or should, necessarily have resolutions. It's that form of thinking
> that leads to the notion of 'drawing lines' - that is coming to
> arbitrary conclusions for the sake of easy legal applicability and
> then, abstracting from that the idea that acting away from these is
> immoral.
>
> It's clear that sex with children is wrong. It's not clear that sex
> with somebody the day before or after their 16th birthday is more or
> less wrong. The question of exactly when somebody ceases to be a child
> is a wrong question - it depends on so many things, particularly the
> person. The reification of the idea of a 'child' is part of the
> problem, it's perfectly possible for the same person to be a 'child'
> in one circumstance, and at the same time, an adult in another or even
> in the same circumstance at a different time. The basic value remains
> the same for everybody, but most moral dilemmas based on this are not
> dilemmas at all, but, rather, silly questions that miss the point -
> only a consideration of a particular real case based on the essential
> values, will yield up a reasonable answer.

Sounds a bit like situation ethics?

http://www.bbc.co.uk/ethics/introduction/situation_1.shtml

Dave Smith

On Aug 26, 9:10 pm, Dave Smith  wrote:
> On 26 Aug, 05:44, Peter Brooks  wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > I think that it's a mistake to believe that all ethical questions can,
> > or should, necessarily have resolutions. It's that form of thinking
> > that leads to the notion of 'drawing lines' - that is coming to
> > arbitrary conclusions for the sake of easy legal applicability and
> > then, abstracting from that the idea that acting away from these is
> > immoral.
>
> > It's clear that sex with children is wrong. It's not clear that sex
> > with somebody the day before or after their 16th birthday is more or
> > less wrong. The question of exactly when somebody ceases to be a child
> > is a wrong question - it depends on so many things, particularly the
> > person. The reification of the idea of a 'child' is part of the
> > problem, it's perfectly possible for the same person to be a 'child'
> > in one circumstance, and at the same time, an adult in another or even
> > in the same circumstance at a different time. The basic value remains
> > the same for everybody, but most moral dilemmas based on this are not
> > dilemmas at all, but, rather, silly questions that miss the point -
> > only a consideration of a particular real case based on the essential
> > values, will yield up a reasonable answer.
>
> Sounds a bit like situation ethics?
>
That's what I remember it being called. It was a popular idea when I
was at school - at least that's the impression a divinity master gave
me.

I worry that labelling it that and making it a specific solution in
itself can lead to relativism - which isn't the objective.

On Aug 25, 9:22 pm, Dave Smith  wrote:
> I've been reading various articles and statements on the
> Naturalism.org website recently, and I have found that they express my
> own worldview rather well.  For instance,  here's a summary of the
> tenets of naturalism.  Comments anyone?
>
> Tenets of Naturalism
>
>  What exists: This version of naturalism asserts that the world is of
> a piece; everything we are and do is included in the space-time
> continuum whose most basic elements are those described by physics. We
> are the evolved products of natural selection, which operates without
> intention, foresight or purpose. Nothing about us escapes being
> included in the physical universe, or escapes being shaped by the
> various processes – physical, biological, psychological, and social –
> that science describes. On a scientific understanding of ourselves,
> there’s no evidence for immaterial souls, spirits, mental essences, or
> disembodied selves which stand apart from the physical world.
>
> What constitutes knowledge: Naturalism as a worldview is based on the
> premise that knowledge about what exists and about how things work is
> best achieved through the sciences, not personal revelation or
> religious tradition. The knowledge we have of ourselves and our place
> in nature is the achievement of a collective effort to construct a
> consistent view of the world that permits prediction and control. This
> effort proceeds by experiment and rational inquiry, and the knowledge
> gained is always subject to further testing as understanding matures.
> Wanting something to be true, or having the intense personal
> conviction that something is true, are never grounds for supposing
> that it is true.  Scientific empiricism has the necessary consequence
> of unifying our knowledge of the world, of placing all objects of
> understanding within an overarching causal context. Under naturalism,
> there is a single, natural world in which phenomena arise.
>
> The causal view: From a naturalistic perspective, there are no
> causally privileged agents, nothing that causes without being caused
> in turn.  Human beings act the way they do because of the various
> influences that shape them, whether these be biological or social,
> genetic or environmental. We do not have the capacity to act outside
> the causal connections that link us in every respect to the rest of
> the world. This means we do not have what many people think of as free
> will, being able to cause our behavior without our being fully caused
> in turn.
>
> The self: As strictly physical beings, we don’t exist as immaterial
> selves, either mental or spiritual, that control behavior. Thought,
> desires, intentions, feelings, and actions all arise on their own
> without the benefit of a supervisory self, and they are all the
> products of a physical system, the brain and the body. The self is
> constituted by more or less consistent sets of personal
> characteristics, beliefs, and actions; it doesn’t exist apart from
> those complex physical processes that make up the individual. It may
> strongly seem as if there is a self sitting behind experience,
> witnessing it, and behind behavior, controlling it, but this
> impression is strongly disconfirmed by a scientific understanding of
> human behavior.
>
> Responsibility and morality: From a naturalistic perspective, behavior
> arises out of the interaction between individuals and their
> environment, not from a freely willing self that produces behavior
> independently of causal connections (see above). Therefore individuals
> don’t bear ultimate originative responsibility for their actions, in
> the sense of being their first cause. Given the circumstances both
> inside and outside the body, they couldn’t have done other than what
> they did. Nevertheless, we must still hold individuals responsible, in
> the sense of applying rewards and sanctions, so that their behavior
> stays more or less within the range of what we deem acceptable. This
> is, partially, how people learn to act ethically. Naturalism doesn’t
> undermine the need or possibility of responsibility and morality, but
> it places them within the world as understood by science. However,
> naturalism does call into question the basis for retributive
> attitudes, namely the idea that individuals could have done otherwise
> in the situation in which their behavior arose and so deeply deserve
> punishment.
>
> The source of value: Because naturalism doubts the existence of
> ultimate purposes either inherent in nature or imposed by a creator,
> values derive from human needs and desires, not supernatural
> absolutes. Basic human values are widely shared by virtue of being
> rooted in our common evolved nature. We need not appeal to a
> supernatural standard of ethical conduct to know that in general it’s
> wrong to lie, cheat, steal, rape, murder, torture, or otherwise treat
> people in ways we’d rather not be treated. Our naturally endowed
> empathetic concern for others and our hard-wired penchant for
> cooperation and reciprocity get us what we most want as social
> creatures: to flourish as individuals within a community. Naturalism
> may show the ultimate contingency of some values, in that human nature
> might have evolved differently and human societies and political
> arrangements might have turned out otherwise. But, given who and what
> we are as natural creatures, we necessarily find ourselves with shared
> basic values which serve as the criteria for assessing moral dilemmas,
> even if these assessments are sometimes fiercely contested and in some
> cases never quite resolved.
>
> http://www.naturalism.org/tenetsof.htm

Why must one go for the whole package? Can't one agree with one part
of this philosophy and disagree with another part?

Lance

On Aug 27, 12:57 am, Gary  wrote:
> On Aug 25, 9:22 pm, Dave Smith  wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > I've been reading various articles and statements on the
> > Naturalism.org website recently, and I have found that they express my
> > own worldview rather well.  For instance,  here's a summary of the
> > tenets of naturalism.  Comments anyone?
>
> > Tenets of Naturalism
>
> >  What exists: This version of naturalism asserts that the world is of
> > a piece; everything we are and do is included in the space-time
> > continuum whose most basic elements are those described by physics. We
> > are the evolved products of natural selection, which operates without
> > intention, foresight or purpose. Nothing about us escapes being
> > included in the physical universe, or escapes being shaped by the
> > various processes – physical, biological, psychological, and social –
> > that science describes. On a scientific understanding of ourselves,
> > there’s no evidence for immaterial souls, spirits, mental essences, or
> > disembodied selves which stand apart from the physical world.
>
> > What constitutes knowledge: Naturalism as a worldview is based on the
> > premise that knowledge about what exists and about how things work is
> > best achieved through the sciences, not personal revelation or
> > religious tradition. The knowledge we have of ourselves and our place
> > in nature is the achievement of a collective effort to construct a
> > consistent view of the world that permits prediction and control. This
> > effort proceeds by experiment and rational inquiry, and the knowledge
> > gained is always subject to further testing as understanding matures.
> > Wanting something to be true, or having the intense personal
> > conviction that something is true, are never grounds for supposing
> > that it is true.  Scientific empiricism has the necessary consequence
> > of unifying our knowledge of the world, of placing all objects of
> > understanding within an overarching causal context. Under naturalism,
> > there is a single, natural world in which phenomena arise.
>
> > The causal view: From a naturalistic perspective, there are no
> > causally privileged agents, nothing that causes without being caused
> > in turn.  Human beings act the way they do because of the various
> > influences that shape them, whether these be biological or social,
> > genetic or environmental. We do not have the capacity to act outside
> > the causal connections that link us in every respect to the rest of
> > the world. This means we do not have what many people think of as free
> > will, being able to cause our behavior without our being fully caused
> > in turn.
>
> > The self: As strictly physical beings, we don’t exist as immaterial
> > selves, either mental or spiritual, that control behavior. Thought,
> > desires, intentions, feelings, and actions all arise on their own
> > without the benefit of a supervisory self, and they are all the
> > products of a physical system, the brain and the body. The self is
> > constituted by more or less consistent sets of personal
> > characteristics, beliefs, and actions; it doesn’t exist apart from
> > those complex physical processes that make up the individual. It may
> > strongly seem as if there is a self sitting behind experience,
> > witnessing it, and behind behavior, controlling it, but this
> > impression is strongly disconfirmed by a scientific understanding of
> > human behavior.
>
> > Responsibility and morality: From a naturalistic perspective, behavior
> > arises out of the interaction between individuals and their
> > environment, not from a freely willing self that produces behavior
> > independently of causal connections (see above). Therefore individuals
> > don’t bear ultimate originative responsibility for their actions, in
> > the sense of being their first cause. Given the circumstances both
> > inside and outside the body, they couldn’t have done other than what
> > they did. Nevertheless, we must still hold individuals responsible, in
> > the sense of applying rewards and sanctions, so that their behavior
> > stays more or less within the range of what we deem acceptable. This
> > is, partially, how people learn to act ethically. Naturalism doesn’t
> > undermine the need or possibility of responsibility and morality, but
> > it places them within the world as understood by science. However,
> > naturalism does call into question the basis for retributive
> > attitudes, namely the idea that individuals could have done otherwise
> > in the situation in which their behavior arose and so deeply deserve
> > punishment.
>
> > The source of value: Because naturalism doubts the existence of
> > ultimate purposes either inherent in nature or imposed by a creator,
> > values derive from human needs and desires, not supernatural
> > absolutes. Basic human values are widely shared by virtue of being
> > rooted in our common evolved nature. We need not appeal to a
> > supernatural standard of ethical conduct to know that in general it’s
> > wrong to lie, cheat, steal, rape, murder, torture, or otherwise treat
> > people in ways we’d rather not be treated. Our naturally endowed
> > empathetic concern for others and our hard-wired penchant for
> > cooperation and reciprocity get us what we most want as social
> > creatures: to flourish as individuals within a community. Naturalism
> > may show the ultimate contingency of some values, in that human nature
> > might have evolved differently and human societies and political
> > arrangements might have turned out otherwise. But, given who and what
> > we are as natural creatures, we necessarily find ourselves with shared
> > basic values which serve as the criteria for assessing moral dilemmas,
> > even if these assessments are sometimes fiercely contested and in some
> > cases never quite resolved.
>
> >http://www.naturalism.org/tenetsof.htm
>
> Why must one go for the whole package? Can't one agree with one part
> of this philosophy and disagree with another part?
>
That is surely a possibility. What parts were you wanting to disagree
with?

It's like package holidays, they suit many people, and involve much
less logistical work than independent travel. Sometimes, though, only
the package will do - as I discovered on my only package tour to
Albania, there was no other way of getting to the country at the time.

On 26 Aug, 23:57, Gary  wrote:

> Why must one go for the whole package? Can't one agree with one part
> of this philosophy and disagree with another part?

Maybe you only accept the package in part?  I would be interested to
know to what extent people who agree with any one of the tenets agree
with the others.  It seems to me that those who are committed to
scientific methods of inquiry are likely to reject supernatural forces
and dualism,  to be sceptical of  the notion of free will,  to see
problems with the notion of moral responsibility, to doubt the
existence of souls, and so on.

Dave Smith

On 26 Aug, 19:46, Dave Smith  wrote:

> Our values presumably reflect our biology, development and current
> circumstances, so there are bound to be individual differences.
> However, there is much common ground within groups and even between
> groups, as regards, for instance, violence, theft, sharing resources,
> sexual taboos, co-operation, and so on.  If there was no common
> ground, wouldn't moral debate be pointless?

The reason we have that debate is because there isn't a common
ground.
People will say violence is wrong - but then support a war.
They'll say theft is wrong and yet say it's OK for a starving man to
steal food to feed his family
Sharing resources? Our local Council tried that but in the end it was
voted out.
... ...adn so on.

On Sep 3, 2:41 am, sdm_sax  wrote:
> On 26 Aug, 19:46, Dave Smith  wrote:
>
> > Our values presumably reflect our biology, development and current
> > circumstances, so there are bound to be individual differences.
> > However, there is much common ground within groups and even between
> > groups, as regards, for instance, violence, theft, sharing resources,
> > sexual taboos, co-operation, and so on.  If there was no common
> > ground, wouldn't moral debate be pointless?
>
> The reason we have that debate is because there isn't a common
> ground.
> People will say violence is wrong - but then support a war.
> They'll say theft is wrong and yet say it's OK for a starving man to
> steal food to feed his family
> Sharing resources? Our local Council tried that but in the end it was
> voted out.
> ... ...adn so on.
>
That's the point about morality. You can choose not to be moral, but
you ought to know that you've made that choice and that the choice has
consequences for you, or may have them.

Whether to breath or not is not a moral question because we can't
choose to live and give it up.

On 3 Sep, 01:41, sdm_sax  wrote:
> On 26 Aug, 19:46, Dave Smith  wrote:
>
> > Our values presumably reflect our biology, development and current
> > circumstances, so there are bound to be individual differences.
> > However, there is much common ground within groups and even between
> > groups, as regards, for instance, violence, theft, sharing resources,
> > sexual taboos, co-operation, and so on.  If there was no common
> > ground, wouldn't moral debate be pointless?
>
> The reason we have that debate is because there isn't a common
> ground.
> People will say violence is wrong - but then support a war.
> They'll say theft is wrong and yet say it's OK for a starving man to
> steal food to feed his family
> Sharing resources? Our local Council tried that but in the end it was
> voted out.
> ... ...adn so on.

Well, here I take 'common ground' to refer to a certain amount of
agreement between different parties.  Maybe, for instance, most people
will agree a particular act in particular circumstances is morally
wrong.

Dave Smith

On 3 Sep, 05:34, Peter Brooks  wrote:

> That's the point about morality. You can choose not to be moral, but
> you ought to know that you've made that choice and that the choice has
> consequences for you, or may have them.

No, I mean whether it is moral or not in the first place. I don't
believe there is a consensus. There is acknowledgment of what people
SAY is moral, but It seems to vary quite a bit depending on age,
location, wealth, health and such factors which may affect a persons
view. It comes down to just that, morality is just someone's opinion.

On 3 Sep, 20:47, Dave Smith  wrote:

> Well, here I take 'common ground' to refer to a certain amount of
> agreement between different parties.  Maybe, for instance, most people
> will agree a particular act in particular circumstances is morally
> wrong.

Common ground is like common sense. Turns out not to be so prevalent.
Some issues will have a clear majority, others will have an almost
equal split.  Some stances will get turned on their head, like our
view of homosexuality being immoral.  Do you just follow the trend or
have a reasoned view?

On 5 Sep, 00:48, sdm_sax  wrote:
> On 3 Sep, 05:34, Peter Brooks  wrote:
>
> > That's the point about morality. You can choose not to be moral, but
> > you ought to know that you've made that choice and that the choice has
> > consequences for you, or may have them.
>
> No, I mean whether it is moral or not in the first place. I don't
> believe there is a consensus. There is acknowledgment of what people
> SAY is moral, but It seems to vary quite a bit depending on age,
> location, wealth, health and such factors which may affect a persons
> view. It comes down to just that, morality is just someone's opinion.

I think a person's moral views are derived from their values, but also
from their beliefs about factual matters.  A supporter of the death
penalty, for example, might feel that a murderer deserves to die, but
might also argue that capital punishment is a general deterrent.  The
facts of the matter can be investigated objectively.  Also, thinking
about the values that underlie moral judgements might result in some
revision of those values.  For instance, a person who adopts a more
deterministic stance to other people's actions might find his feelings
about those actions have been modified.

Dave Smith

On 5 Sep, 21:40, Dave Smith  wrote:

> I think a person's moral views are derived from their values, but also
> from their beliefs about factual matters.  A supporter of the death
> penalty, for example, might feel that a murderer deserves to die, but
> might also argue that capital punishment is a general deterrent.  The
> facts of the matter can be investigated objectively.  Also, thinking
> about the values that underlie moral judgements might result in some
> revision of those values.  For instance, a person who adopts a more
> deterministic stance to other people's actions might find his feelings
> about those actions have been modified.

So are you going for a personal morality or a common ground sort?

I think people that have moral values may have some consensus but
there's a lot of yobs about who think it's OK to vandalize, nick
stuff, do drugs, carry a knife, sell dodgy fags, joy ride etc etc.
They value their fun & games above.
Then there's the more common middle ground who seem to think it's OK
to buy dodgy fags, drive too fast, do drugs, download Mp3s, sleep with
their friend's partner or whatever. They're just trying to  get by and
make the most of reasonable opportunities.

They did some experiments with people a while back where they left
some money lying around and waited to see if it got nicked, and if
someone took it whether they reported it/ handed it to the police.
IIRC the results varied with the amount of money. You might say the
moral judgment was the same for all amounts but feelings were modifed
with the amounts. What value then is a moral stance if it is ignored?

On 6 Sep, 00:54, sdm_sax  wrote:

> So are you going for a personal morality or a common ground sort?

A bit of both.

> I think people that have moral values may have some consensus but
> there's a lot of yobs about who think it's OK to vandalize, nick
> stuff, do drugs, carry a knife, sell dodgy fags, joy ride etc etc.
> They value their fun & games above.
> Then there's the more common middle ground who seem to think it's OK
> to buy dodgy fags, drive too fast, do drugs, download Mp3s, sleep with
> their friend's partner or whatever. They're just trying to  get by and
> make the most of reasonable opportunities.
>
> They did some experiments with people a while back where they left
> some money lying around and waited to see if it got nicked, and if
> someone took it whether they reported it/ handed it to the police.
> IIRC the results varied with the amount of money. You might say the
> moral judgment was the same for all amounts but feelings were modifed
> with the amounts. What value then is a moral stance if it is ignored?

There have been dozens of experiments in which envelopes are dropped
to see whether they are returned,  people are given too much change in
shops to see whether they pocket the money, etc. -- see, for instance
Richard Wiseman's book 'Quirkology' for a non-technical account. The
results certainly don't testify to the overwhelming honesty of joe
public,  but at least some people act unselfishly.

Dave Smith

On 6 Sep, 23:17, Dave Smith  wrote:

> There have been dozens of experiments in which envelopes are dropped
> to see whether they are returned,  people are given too much change in
> shops to see whether they pocket the money, etc. -- see, for instance
> Richard Wiseman's book 'Quirkology' for a non-technical account. The
> results certainly don't testify to the overwhelming honesty of joe
> public,  but at least some people act unselfishly.

Yeah, so where does it leave morality? Do you think it is recognised
or just ignored?

Steve

On 7 Sep, 00:43, sdm_sax  wrote:
> On 6 Sep, 23:17, Dave Smith  wrote:
>
> > There have been dozens of experiments in which envelopes are dropped
> > to see whether they are returned,  people are given too much change in
> > shops to see whether they pocket the money, etc. -- see, for instance
> > Richard Wiseman's book 'Quirkology' for a non-technical account. The
> > results certainly don't testify to the overwhelming honesty of joe
> > public,  but at least some people act unselfishly.
>
> Yeah, so where does it leave morality? Do you think it is recognised
> or just ignored?
>
> Steve

I don't know.  I feel moral standards have slipped a bit in recent
years in the UK, but maybe that's just because I'm getting old.  A
relevant research study is discussed in the news today, with different
reports having different slants:

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/8240985.stm

http://www.guardian.co.uk/science/2009/sep/07/survey-lawyers-honesty-public-attitudes

http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/law/article6823915.ece

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/debates/6148988/Is-there-a-generation-gap-in-honesty.html

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-1211629/How-80-think-OK-steal-work-study-reveals-wavering-moral-compass.html


Dave Smith