Re: Amerikkkans like Gray Ghost Frank = Utterly Pig-Ignorant about History ....... Felons say Supreme Court's ruling means they cannot be barred from owning guns
"Reality_Check©" wrote in news:6eqkp6F8ds18U1
@mid.individual.net:
>
> "Gray Ghost" wrote
>> "Reality_Check©" wrote in
>>> "Gray Ghost" wrote in message
>>>> "Reality_Check©" wrote
>>>>> "richard" wrote in message
>>>>>> On Wed, 23 Jul 2008 14:31:59 -0600, "_ Prof. Jonez _"
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>Bama Brian wrote:
>>>>>>>> Reality_Check© wrote:
>>>>>>>>> "David Hartung" wrote in message
>>>>>>>>>> _ Prof. Jonez _ wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> Gray Ghost wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> And in so doing saved the lives of many more people by forcing
>>>>>>>>>>>> the Japanese out of the war.
>>>>>>>>>>> Complte BULLSHIT apologia.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> So it would be ok for another nation to nuke a major U$ city, if
>>>>>>>>>>> they believed it would "save more lives" from their point of
>>>>>>>>>>> view, eh numbnuts?
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Your absence of morality is repugnant. May your family be the
>>>>>>>>>>> first to suffer from it.
>>>>>>>>>> Truman, using the information he had available at the time,
>>>>>>>>>> determined that the use of nuclear weapons would bring the War to
>>>>>>>>>> an end without the necessity of invading the Japanese Home
>>>>>>>>>> Islands.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> So it was done for expedience, easier for the U$$A.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Given the record of the war, it is likely that doing so not only
>>>>>>>>>> saved thousands of American lives, but also Japanese lives.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Utterly bullshit speculation.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Why is this a bad thing?
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> If deliberately dropping NUCLEAR BOMBS upon civilian population
>>>>>>>>> centers -- TWICE --
>>>>>>>>> killing 100,000+ innocent civilians, women and children in the
>>>>>>>>> process isn't a "bad thing"
>>>>>>>>> in your world, then you really should be in the dock ahead of
>>>>>>>>> Karadzic, you repugnant
>>>>>>>>> piece of crap.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Do you remember how the Pacific War started? The Japanese bombed
>>>>>>>> Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 in a complete sneak attack.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>You really are a pig-ignorant imbecile <typical yank> if you,
>>>>>>>being over the age of 8, think for a moment that's "how the Pacific
>>>>>>>War started".
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>ROTFLMAO!
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> No. It is how the US became involved in an already existing war.
>>>>>
>>>>> Close ... but still wrong as usual, Richard.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Please clarify. I've been studying this period for 20+ years. Seems to
>>>> eb the consensus of historians up to this point. Have you another fact
>>>> based view?
>>>
>>> The U$ was already "involved" in an economic war agaist Japan prior to
>>> Pearl Harbor,
>>> by overtly supporting China in it's war with Japan, the U$ embargo of
>>> scrap metal, gasoline
>>> and oil against Japan during it's war with China places the U$A directly
>>> in the hostilities
>>> against Japan. The further blockade of all Japanese ships from the Panama
>>> Canal long
>>> before Pearl Harbor was yet another open hostile wartime act against
>>> Japan, the above placing
>>> Japan in grave jeapordy from its enemies.
>>>
>>> You openly fuck with another country that is at war, taking sides,
>>> supporting their enemies, engaging in direct harmful acts of economic and
>>> logistic sabbotage, encourage other nations to do the same, jeapordise
>>> and harm the safety of that nation via their ability to defend themselves
>>> against their wartime enemies, then YOU have willingly and openly placed
>>> yourself at war with said nation(s).
>>>
>>
>> So you approve of the Rape of Nanking
>
> You're lying again you amoral piece of crap.
>
No I'm asking a question. I don't see you being upset by the Rape of Nanking,
nly by US actions.
Listen you fucking wop bastard, how about:
Italian Fascist War Crimes in Ethiopia: A History of Their Discussion, from
the League of Nations to the United Nations (1936-1949)
Richard Pankhurst
Addis Ababa University
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
---
Introduction
The 1935-36 Italian fascist invasion and subsequent occupation of Ethiopia
were accompanied by numerous atrocities: the use of mustard gas, the bombing
of Red Cross hospitals and ambulances, the execution of captured prisoners
without trial, the Graziani massacre, the killings at Däbrä Libanos
monastery, and the shooting of "witch-doctors" accused of prophesying the end
of fascist rule. These acts are historically interesting, not only in
themselves, but also in that they were brought to the international
community's attention on two separate occasions: to the League of Nations,
when they were committed, and later, to the United Nations.
Fascist atrocities, though widely condemned by individuals and organizations,
passed officially unnoticed by the League of Nations and were the subject of
judicial consideration only after Italy's entry into the European World War
in 1940. The question of these crimes was then reopened, in the newly
established UN War Crimes Commission. Though based on power politics and
political opportunism, the founding of this body reflected a shift in
international thinking and re-shaping of international law.
The present article, which throws incidental light on changing international
attitudes to Ethiopia, attempts to trace the tortuous history of these war-
crimes discussions, and to examine why the efforts of the Ethiopian
government to have war-criminals tried were less successful than those of
other Allies. [End Page 83]
The League of Nations: Initial Reports
The Ethiopian Minister of Foreign Affairs supplied the League of Nations with
irrefutable information on Fascist war crimes, including the use of poison
gas and the bombing of Red Cross hospitals and ambulances, from within a few
hours of the Italian invasion on 3 October 1935 to 10 April of the following
year. 1 Further charges were made by Emperor Haylä Sellasé, to the League's
General Assembly on 30 June. 2 Later, on 17 March 1937, he requested the
League's Secretary-General to appoint an Inquiry Commission to investigate
crimes committed in Ethiopia. 3 Such appeals made a deep public impression,
but the League took no official action on the matter.
The European War: Growing Interest in War Crimes
The September 1939 outbreak of the European war was followed, in June 1940,
by Fascist Italy's entry into the conflict. Continental Europe was soon
occupied by the Axis powers, Germany and Italy, which reportedly committed
many atrocities. The shocked Allies developed a keener interest in "war
crimes" than when these had been perpetrated in far-off Ethiopia.
The "war crimes" question was first raised by the European refugee
governments, established in Britain, who spoke on behalf of nine countries:
France, Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg, Norway, Poland, Czechoslovakia,
Yugoslavia, and Greece. Ethiopia, it should be noted, had by then been
liberated, but was under British occupation. The representatives of these
countries participated at a London meeting, on 13 January 1942, and condemned
Nazi Germany's "regime of terror," resolving that those responsible be
brought to justice. 4 This declaration was accepted by the United States,
which had entered the war a month earlier. President Franklin Roosevelt
declared on 21 August that those "committing barbaric crimes" should, at the
end of the war, be "subjected to due process of law." 5 On 7 October, he
announced that the United States would "co-operate . . . in establishing a
United Nations Commission for the investigation of war crimes," and promised
that "just and sure punishment" would be meted out to those "responsible for
the organized murder of thousands of innocent persons" and "the commission of
atrocities violating every tenet of Christian faith." 6 [End Page 84]
The war crimes issue came further to the fore as evidence of Nazi atrocities
against the Jews filtered out of occupied Europe. On 17 December 1942, a
declaration was read out in the British House of Commons, stating that
Britain, the USA, the USSR, and the nine émigré governments affirmed their
"solemn resolution" that those responsible for crimes should "not escape
retribution." 7
This declaration applied only to crimes committed by the Germans in Europe.
The latter were outside Allied jurisdiction, but statements condemning them
were important in Allied war propaganda. Virtually nothing was said about
Fascist Italy, either about atrocities it was committing in Europe, or those
it had earlier carried out in Ethiopia.
Changing Allied Positions: Mussolini and Badoglio
Allied thinking on war crimes underwent an important shift, in the summer of
1943. After the Anglo-American landings in Sicily on 10 July, it became
apparent that Italy might soon fall. This led the Allies to reconsider their
attitude to Mussolini, and to the leaders who might succeed him. The American
and British leaders took the view that the veteran Italian commander, Marshal
Pietro Badoglio, was a man with whom they should collaborate. Though he had
used poison gas in Ethiopia, they did not consider him a war criminal, but as
a force for European stability. One of those supporting him was Carlton-
Hayes, the American Ambassador in Spain, who told his British counterpart,
Sir Samuel Hoare on 20 July, that he favoured a Regency in Italy, with
Badoglio as "the strong man." 8
Mussolini's Fall and Badoglio's Appointment
Speculations on Italy's future were suddenly cut short when the fascist Grand
Council voted on 24 July for Mussolini's dismissal. On the following day King
Vittorio Emanuele appointed Badoglio Prime Minister.
The dictator's fall, and the new Premier's appointment had dramatic
consequences--which were to have a major bearing on the question of Italy's
war crimes in Ethiopia. In the United States, Roosevelt at once took the
lead. On the following day he proclaimed that the Duce was a war criminal. He
telegraphed to Prime Minister Winston Churchill that Mussolini, and his
principal supporters, [End Page 85] should be immediately arrested. Speaking
of the Duce, he declared, "the Head Devil should be surrendered together with
his chief partners in crime." 9
The British War Cabinet on 26 July, heard Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden
argue that it would be "greatly to our advantage" not to administer Italy
directly, but to have it "run for us, as far as possible," by an Italian
government. His colleagues agreed. 10 Nothing was specifically said about war
criminals. Cabinet members, however, had before them a Secret Memorandum,
from Churchill, paragraph 12 of which alluded to Roosevelt's reference to
Mussolini, the "Head Devil," and commented:
The surrender of, to quote the President, "the head devil" together with his
partners in crime must be considered an eminent object and one for which we
should strive by all the means in our power. . . . Should they fall into our
hands, we ought now to decide in consultation with the United States and
after agreement with them with the USSR what treatment should be meted out to
them.
As for Allied policy, Churchill continued, with a brutality he had never
previously displayed in relation to Mussolini:
Some may prefer prompt execution without trial. . . . Others may prefer that
they be kept in confinement till the end of the war in Europe, and their fate
decided together with that of other war criminals. Personally I am fairly
indifferent on this matter, provided always that no solid military advantages
are sacrificed for the sake of immediate vengeance. 11
Italy's Surrender, and Proposed Allied Demand for War Criminals
That same day, 26 July, the British government finalized a first Draft
Instrument for the Italian Surrender. Article 30 declared:
All persons suspected of having committed war crimes or analogous offenses,
whose names appear on lists to be communicated by the United Nations, will
forthwith be apprehended and surrendered into the hands [End Page 86] of the
United Nations. Any instructions given by the United Nations for this purpose
will be complied with.
Roosevelt meanwhile continued to press for the Duce's prosecution. On 28
July, he declared that Mussolini and "his Fascist gang" should be "brought to
book and punished for their crimes against humanity," adding that "no
criminal will be allowed to escape." 12
Despite these strong words, he almost immediately had second thoughts.
Continuing to urge the need for an Italian surrender, he nevertheless
declared it expedient to abandon any formal reference to war crimes. On the
terms to be offered by the Allied commander, Dwight Eisenhower, he
telegraphed Churchill on 30 July: "It is my opinion that the question of war
criminals should not be brought up by General Eisenhower in a statement of
his aims for an armistice." Elaborating on this, he continued:
It is our opinion that an effort to seize the "head devil" in the early
future would prejudice our primary objective, which is to get Italy out of
the war. We can secure the person of the 'head devil' and his assistants in
due time, and then determine their individual degrees of guilt for which the
punishment should fit the crime. . . .
The war criminal problem can be taken up later, and I believe that all
demands by the Allied Nations that are not essential to the present time
should be postponed with the purpose of getting Italy out of the war at the
earliest possible date. 13
This sudden U.S. policy change created some surprise in the British Foreign
Office, which nevertheless willingly accepted it. On 31 July, a staff member,
Pierson Dixon, noted that: "In pressing for our full instrument of surrender,
we have told the Prime Minister that we could agree to the omission from the
text of the clause concerning war criminals." Noting the significance of
this, as far as Mussolini was concerned, he continued:
If nothing is to be said about war criminals in general . . . , I suppose it
follows that nothing should be said about Mussolini specifically. This must,
I think be the President's idea, since it was he himself who, at an earlier
stage, said he thought that "the head devil should be surrendered, together
with his chief partners in crime. [End Page 87]
Dixon commented that it was "far from clear" what the President's message
meant "when translated into action," but concluded that Roosevelt seemed to
assume that Italy's surrender would be effected in two separate stages," i.e.
"short term" ones, followed by "discussion of our future requirements."
Mussolini's surrender was not "provided for" in the former, but would be in
the latter. 14
House of Commons Questions on Badoglio and Mussolini
Fascist Italy's collapse had a profound world-wide impact. In Britain, Leslie
Carruthers, a correspondent of the pro-Ethiopian publication New Times and
Ethiopia News, appealed to British Foreign Secretary Eden, on 25 July, for an
assurance that the Government would "have no official dealings with Marshal
Badoglio," but would "exact his extradition to Ethiopia, to be tried for his
violation of the International Gas Convention." 15
The situation in Italy also led to Parliamentary Questions in the House of
Commons. The first, on 3 August, was by a Unionist MP, Major Vyvyan Adams, a
member of the London-based Abyssinia Association. Fearing a possible British
deal with Badoglio, and possibly "back sliding" in relation to the Duce, he
put down two questions for the Foreign Secretary.
The first concerned Badoglio, who, Adams was well aware, had been responsible
for the use of poison-gas in Ethiopia. The marshal, who had just been
appointed Italian Prime Minister, was then actively collaborating with the
Germans. The Major asked Eden "whether he would bring the behaviour of
Marshal Badoglio in Ethiopia to the attention of the United Nations Tribunal
for the trial of War Criminals."
This question, which, according to Parliamentary practice, was put down in
advance, embarrassed the Foreign Office, for four main reasons:
1. It anticipated that Badoglio was about to sue for peace, and might be
discouraged if personally indicted as a war criminal.
2. It wanted Italy in the Western camp and favored a right-wing ruler, to
curtail anarchist or revolutionary tendencies.
3. It had recognized the Italian fascist "conquest" of Ethiopia in 1938 and
opposed discussion of the war crimes which had preceded, and led to, that
event. [End Page 88]
4. Being colonially minded, and/or racially prejudiced, it considered
Ethiopia outside the confines of European statesmanship. This view had
earlier been expounded by the Foreign Under-Secretary, Sir Orme Sargent, who,
on 22 August 1942, wrote that he felt "doubts" about "admitting Abyssinia
into the sacred circle of the Allied Nations with all that implies both
during the war and at the peace settlement." 16
The Foreign Office was bitterly opposed to the trial of Italians for war
crimes in Ethiopia, but was in a predicament. It was difficult to argue that
crimes committed there in 1935-36 should be excluded from consideration on
the grounds that they had occurred prior to outbreak of the European war, in
September 1939. China, a powerful ally, had insisted on trying Japanese war
criminals for the entire period of the Japanese invasion, starting in the
late 1920s or early 1930s, i.e. half a decade or so earlier. Major Adams'
question was therefore not appreciated by the Foreign Office, but it had to
be answered.
The difficulty in doing so was explained to Eden by a Foreign Office
official, William Allen, in a departmental minute, of 2 August. Proposing an
answer for the Minister, he observed:
The answer is, I think, that the United Nations Commission for the
Investigation of War Criminals will deal only with war crimes committed
during the present war against nationals of the United Nations. But we must
be a little careful in replying on these lines since we know, for instance,
that the Chinese are going to press for all crimes committed by the Japanese
in China since 1931 to be brought within the Commission's scope.
Another official, the legal adviser, Gerald Fitzmaurice, also took up a
defensive position. Referring to Adams's "petition," he noted on the
following day that the major's question as to whether the Government would
send Badoglio for trial deserved an unqualified "No." Elaborating on this,
and by implication attacking Adams's good faith, he observed, not without
some truth, that the major's object was "more to create prejudice against
Marshal Badoglio in view of the present situation than anything genuinely to
do with War Crimes." 17
Guided by his officials, and particularly by the warning that the Chinese
wanted trials going back well before 1935, Eden answered in the vaguest terms
[End Page 89] on 4 August. Avoiding any mention of the delicate matter as to
the date from which the British Government wanted war crimes to be
considered, he took refuge in the contention that the War Crimes Commission
was an Allied rather than a British responsibility, and that Britain could
interest itself only in crimes related to Britons or committed on British
territory. He did not mention that it was the British Government which had
selected the commission's membership and had framed its terms of reference.
Eden's 4 August reply was thus intentionally brief. It declared that "the
scope of the [Allied War Crimes] Commission was a matter for decision by all
the Allied Governments concerned. It will not be for Her Majesty's Government
to submit to the Commission evidence of war crimes committed neither in
British territory nor against British subjects." Though the question had been
about Badoglio, he was not mentioned in the reply.
Adams, however, did not easily accept such evasion. He rose at once to pose a
Supplementary Question, about Badoglio, "Would not one of the purposes for
which we are fighting be frustrated," he asked, "if we allowed to go untried
a man with such an infamous record of cruelty?" Eden, a politician long
practiced in Parliamentary evasion, chose to leave this question unanswered.
The British Government clearly had no wish to see Badoglio tried.
The major's question about Mussolini, which followed immediately, received
very different treatment. Adams asked Eden "whether he will state the
agreement of His Majesty's Government to President Roosevelt's undertaking
that Benito Mussolini will not be allowed to escape." To this the Foreign
Secretary, Eden, triumphantly replied:
His Majesty's Government recently consulted the United States and Soviet
Governments with a view to issuing a warning to certain neutral governments
against providing shelter or protection to Mussolini, prominent Fascists and
other war criminals who might try to seek asylum in neutral territory. As a
result of these consultations, His Majesty's representatives at Angorra,
Berne, Buonos Ayres, Lisbon, Madrid, Stockholm, and the Vatican were
instructed to make a communication in the following terms . . . :
In view of developments in Italy and the possibility that Mussolini and other
prominent Fascists and persons guilty of war crimes may attempt to take
refuge in neutral territory His Majesty's Government in the United [End Page
90] Kingdom feel obliged to call all neutral countries to refuse asylum to
any such persons, and to declare that they will regard shelter, assistance or
protection given to such persons as a violation of the principles for which
the United Nations are fighting . . . . 18
This was the first official British statement accepting that Mussolini and
his collaborators were "war criminals"--though it did not specify where their
"war crimes" had been committed.
Italy's Surrender and Badoglio's Continuation in Power
Meanwhile in Italy, Mussolini's fall was followed by the collapse of fascism.
The country's future seemed to the British alarmingly uncertain. A Foreign
Office memorandum of 7 August reported Communist demonstrations in Turin and
Milan, which "had to be put down by armed force," and added "If the King were
overthrown there would be a blood bath." A memorandum of 18 August spoke of
"revolts . . . which could quite possibly terminate in revolution and
anarchy." 19
Badoglio meanwhile was preparing to abandon the Germans and to negotiate
peace. He sent secret envoys to the Allies who, however, rejected his first
approaches. The British Government officially insisted instead on
"unconditional surrender." This position, however, was soon qualified.
Churchill told Eden, on 10 August, that though the Italians had to make a
"formal act of submission," Britain should "treat them with consideration so
far as military exigencies allow. Merely harping on 'unconditional
surrender' with no prospect of mercy held out even as an act of grace may
well lead to no surrender at all." He therefore declared, following
Roosevelt, that "unconditional surrender" should be taken to mean "honourable
capitulation." 20
This was duly accepted by the British Cabinet. On 11 August, Eden declared
that "the Italian Government should place themselves in the hands of the
Allied Governments," who would "then state their terms of peace." These,
however, "would not be vindictive," for Italy should "in due course. . . .
occupy a respected place in the New Europe." 21
Though prepared to modify their earlier public insistence on "unconditional
surrender," the Allies continued to press for the surrender of some fascist
"war [End Page 91] criminals." This principle was embodied in Article 29 of
the final surrender terms, which declared:
Benito Mussolini, his chief Fascist associates and all persons suspected of
having committed war crimes or analogous offenses whose names appear on lists
to be communicated by the United Nations will forthwith be apprehended and
surrendered into the hands of the United Nations. Any instructions given by
the United Nations for this purpose will be complied with.
To meet Italian susceptibilities this article--which later provided the basis
for Ethiopia's attempt to try Italian war criminals--was not, however,
published for many weeks. 22
Italy's alliance with Nazi Germany came to an end on 8 September. That day
Badoglio, doubtless pleased by British acceptance of the principle of
"honourable capitulation," declared it was impossible to continue the
"unequal struggle" and agreed to "unconditional surrender." Allied landings
on the Italian peninsula followed immediately. The Times commented: "The
Italy which has surrendered is the Italy which has been defeated on every
battlefield, a people left helpless and confused, with few arms, united only
in the desire for peace." 23
The UN War Crimes Commission: Creech Jones's Parliamentary Question on
Ethiopia's Exclusion
Within a few weeks of Badoglio's switch of allegiance it became apparent that
Ethiopia had been excluded from the seventeen-country UN War Crimes
Commission, set up by Britain, on 20 October 1943. Ten days later a banner
headline in New Times and Ethiopia News read: "Why is Ethiopia Excluded?"
British friends of Ethiopia found this exclusion disturbing. Towards the end
of the month, a Labour MP, Creech Jones, put down a Parliamentary Question.
Learning that Ethiopia was virtually the only Allied state not represented on
the commission, he asked the Foreign Secretary whether it was "proposed to
invite Ethiopia to serve with members of the United Nations on the commission
. . . ?"
This question was as embarrassing to the Foreign Office as Major Adams's one
about Badoglio. This was because the British Government had decided to [End
Page 92] exclude Ethiopia, but did not relish explaining its reasons. Allen
was obliged to draw up a further lengthy Foreign Office memorandum, on 31
October.
He began by discussing the commission's origins. "The proposal for the United
Nations Commission for War Crimes arose," he noted, "from the initiative of
the Allied Governments of the occupied countries of Europe. It was decided
from the beginning," he continued, "that our discussions should be limited to
those Governments and to the three other major Powers [i.e., the United
States, the Soviet Union, and China] and the Dominion Governments."
Membership thus consisted, besides Britain, of (1) exiled European
Governments under Axis domination; (2) the three other Great Powers; and (3)
the British Dominions. Ethiopia was not mentioned by name, but did not fall
within any of these fairly arbitrary categories.
Elaborating on the criteria chosen for membership he added: "Apart from
reasons of practical convenience we were influenced in maintaining this
attitude by the views of the Soviet Government, which informed us that they
felt that there were two necessary qualifications for membership of any
country, namely, that such country should be actively fighting the Axis
Powers and should have 'suffered' at the hands of the enemy." Allen's
implication was that Ethiopia, by then liberated, was no longer "actively
fighting." (The British Government had rejected an Ethiopian offer of
troops). 24 Whether the country had "suffered" sufficiently was left
unstated. Though using the Soviets to justify Ethiopia's exclusion, he
explained that they had later also been excluded. "Difficulties" over
representation of their constituent Republics, he stated, had caused the
commission to be established "without the Soviet Government's
participation."
Coming finally to the question of Ethiopia's exclusion, and to the
commission's competence to consider crimes prior to 1939, he argued (a) that
Ethiopia should not be a commission member, and (b) that Italian crimes
committed in Ethiopia prior to Italy's entry into the European war should not
be considered. He thus declared:
As far as Ethiopia is concerned there can I think be no question of her being
admitted to the Commission itself. Nor, according to our present proposals,
will the Commission be prepared to consider war crimes committed in Abyssinia
by the Italians before the outbreak of the present war. [End Page 93]
He made, however, one small concession, declaring that "if the Ethiopian
Government are able to bring before the Commission any information regarding
war crimes committed against their nationals during the present war, there
will probably be nothing to prevent them from doing so." This proviso
applied, it will be perceived, only to a time when there were virtually no
recorded Italian war crimes, rather than the period of the invasion and early
occupation when there were many. Yet he circumscribed even that concession,
observing that whether Ethiopia would actually be entitled to offer
information would be "a matter for decision by all Governments represented
upon the Commission and not by H.M. Government alone."
This remark prompted the legal official, Sir Herbert Malkin, to raise two
further points, in a minute of 1 November, which illustrate Foreign Office
thinking. Commenting on Allen's remark that Ethiopia might be permitted to
provide information on crimes "during the present war," he observed:
This rather assumes that the Governments whose representatives compose the
Commission have all recognised the independence of Ethiopia, but perhaps we
need not trouble ourselves about this point. This also applies perhaps to the
question of any war crimes committed against Ethiopians during the present
war, but before we had recognized Ethiopian independence. 25
This latter proviso, if taken literally, would have negated Ethiopia's right
to submit any evidence. Britain did not recognise Ethiopia's independence
until after the termination of hostilities in East Africa. By then fighting
had ended, and there could be, by definition, no war crimes.
Creech Jones's Question, which had led to this exchange of Foreign Office
notes, was answered on 2 November 1943. The reply was given by the Foreign
Under-Secretary, George Hall, in written form, thus preventing Jones from
making any Supplementary Question or back-chat.
Hall's answer, drafted by Allen, justified Ethiopia's exclusion on the ground
that the commission had been established "some time" earlier, and that
additional members, by implication, were not desired. The reply also
incorporated Allen's earlier "concession" that Ethiopia could submit evidence
about crimes [End Page 94] committed "during the present war." The reply,
doubtless to appear conciliatory, began with this "concession" and declared:
The commission will no doubt be prepared to consider any information which
the Ethiopian Government or any other United Nations Government may wish to
submit to it regarding crimes committed against their nationals by our common
enemies during the course of the present war. It is not, however, the
intention to invite Governments not hitherto associated with discussions on
war crimes, which have been proceeding for some time past, to serve on the
Commission. 26
The question of war crimes was meanwhile gaining increased international
attention. A Moscow Declaration, signed by Churchill, Roosevelt, and the
Soviet leader Stalin, on 1 November, stated their determination to pursue war
criminals "to the uttermost ends of the earth," and to "deliver them to their
accusers in order that justice may be done." 27
A Further Parliamentary Question and Mini-Parliamentary Debate
The question of Ethiopia's exclusion was again raised in the House of Commons
on 3 November, when a Labour MP, Ben Riley, lobbied by Sylvia Pankhurst, put
down a further Parliamentary Question. He asked the Foreign Secretary
"whether Ethiopia is to be included among the United Nations which have
already been announced as a Commission to decide about the treatment of war
criminals."
The Government's reply was given by another spokesman for Foreign Affairs,
Richard Law. Hoping to slide out of the issue by referring to the previous
day's answer, he replied: "I would refer the hon. Member to the written reply
to the hon. Member for Shipley [i.e., Creech Jones] by my friend the Under-
Secretary."
Riley, who had seen such Parliamentary evasion practiced previously, was not
silenced. Reverting to the main issue, Ethiopia's exclusion, he declared: "I
have not seen the reply, but may I ask whether it is not a fact that all the
Allied nations are entitled to be represented on that Commission except
Ethiopia, and why is Ethiopia excluded?" [End Page 95]
Law was obliged to say something. Acting on the earlier Foreign Office brief,
he lamely began by following the line pursued by Eden and Hall, and declared:
"Generally speaking, the policy of the United Nations in this matter is only
that those nations which were associated with this matter at the beginning
should be members of the Commission." Then, doubtless realizing the
inadequacy of this answer, he improvised. Seeking, like Hall, to make it
appear that the British Government had no wish to exclude Ethiopia, he added,
disarmingly, "I can assure the hon. Member . . . that the Ethiopian
Government were informed at the time these negotiations began and that they
offered no comment on them." Both observations were untrue, but since no one
in the House knew this, Law's "inexactitudes" passed uncorrected.
Law's reply nevertheless created disquiet on the Opposition benches. Emanuel
Shinwell, a prominent Labour member, and committed anti-fascist, had not
forgotten the use of poison-gas in Ethiopia. He jumped up to ask the
Supplementary question:
In view of the use of poison-gas by the Italians against the Abyssinians,
would it not be an act of justice to hand over Italian war criminals to the
Ethiopians?
Law tried to stifle this question with four brief words: "That was another
war."
This attempt to discourage discussion provoked a Conservative MP, Kenneth
Pickthorn, to ask, reflectively, "Is it part of the war for democracy that
the elaboration of this new technique about trying war criminals should be
completely accepted without discussion in this House or any effective
discussion in this country?"
Law turned this question to his advantage, declaring with exaggeration:
"There has been a good deal of discussion at Question time at any rate."
That was not, however, the end of the story. Two further MPs intervened. The
first, Sir Herbert Williams, a Conservative, defended the Government's
position, by questioning the right of Ethiopia to commission membership. He
asked, sarcastically, "Can the right hon. Gentleman say on what fronts
Ethiopian troops are now engaged in capturing any of these prisoners?"
Reginald Sorensen, a pacifist Labour member, then spoke more philosophically.
"In view of the obvious difficulties and embarrassments which this and
similar [End Page 96] questions are causing," he demanded, "could we not have
some clearer definition as to what exactly a war criminal is and to what
extent that should cover not only this campaign but others?"
To these interventions, the Government spokesman vouchsafed no reply. 28
Foreign Office Reaction to Law's Parliamentary "Inexactitudes"
The above Parliamentary exchanges were carefully followed at the Foreign
Office. Its officials, better informed than MPs, were somewhat concerned
about Law's Parliamentary "inexactitude," even though it furthered their
overall object of stifling discussion on the sensitive issue of Ethiopia's
exclusion. They knew only too well that the Ethiopian Government had not been
"informed" on the original negotiations concerning the commission, and that
it was equally untrue that it had "offered no comment on them."
Allen, who had drafted Law's bungled reply, was particularly peeved. On the
following day, he wrote a minute on "Mr Law's supplementary assurance that
the Ethiopian Government were informed at the time negotiations for the
establishment of the War Crimes Commission began and that they offered no
comment on them," and bluntly commented "I am afraid that this is not the
case."
Referring to his earlier minute, prepared for reply to Creech Jones, he
recalled that it had, on the contrary, been "decided from the beginning that
our discussions should be limited to the exiled European Governments, the
three other major powers, and the Dominion Governments." As for Law's error,
he added: "The Ethiopian Government were informed in advance of the Looting
declaration issued last December, but they have never been told anything
about the War Crimes Commission."
Allen's statement was in itself bizarre. What he termed the "Looting
declaration," of December 1942, was the Allied declaration incorporated in
Eden's statement of 17 December 1942. It had scarcely any connection with
"looting," but merely enunciated the "solemn resolution of all freedom-loving
peoples to overthrow the barbarous Hitler tyranny" in Europe, and to ensure
that those responsible for "war crimes" should "not escape retribution." 29
This declaration, which was allegedly brought to the Ethiopian Government's
attention, was of no direct relevance to Ethiopia, whereas the War Crimes
Commission, [End Page 97] from which it was excluded, was crucially
important, as far as the trying of Italian war criminals was concerned.
Turning to Ethiopia's continued exclusion, Allen concluded, with some
irritation, that the position would "presumably have to be explained" to the
newly appointed British Minister in Addis Ababa, Robert Howe. "A word," he
suggested, should also be said to the Ethiopian Minister in London, Blatta
Ayalä Gäbré, who (though this had been ignored in Mr Law's reply) had
"already asked for information about the Commission and the possibility of
Ethiopian representation upon it."
Allen was not alone in his disquiet about Law's error. Another official,
Frank Roberts, wrote in a minute the next day: "I do not know how Mr Law
received the impression that the Ethiopian Government had ever been
approached in this matter. It is of course not the case. . . ."
The mystery was solved on the following day. Gilbert MacKereth, an expert on
Ethiopia in the Egyptian Department, confessed:
I am sorry to say that the fault is entirely mine, for Mr Law asked me on
November 3rd. whether the Ethiopian Govt. had been informed about the
commission and I told him that they had right at the beginning, though not
subsequently, and had raised no questions. I was labouring, as was the
Ethiopian Minister when he came to see me on the subject, under the
misapprehension that the war crimes commission was an outcome of the looting
declaration which had been communicated to the Ethiopian Govt. last December.
Turning to the Minister's inquiry, to which Roberts had earlier referred, he
recalled: "he did not ask for representation on the commission, but for
information." He had not been instructed, but had seen perhaps in the Press
about the formation of a commission.
The above minutes were duly seen by poor Law. That day, 5 November, he wrote
a note of his own, in the relevant file. "I am sorry," he declared, "And so
is Mr MacKereth. I hope that between us we haven't caused too much trouble."
30 Despite this apology, he took no steps to explain his error to the House
of Commons he had misled. [End Page 98]
Correspondence from the British Public: Maude Royden's Letter, and Foreign
Office Reactions
The question of Ethiopia's exclusion meanwhile continued to disturb British
friends of Ethiopia. At least three despatched letters to the Government. The
former suffragette Maude Royden wrote to Eden; Sylvia Pankhurst to the
Opposition Chief Whip in the Lords, Lord Strobolgi; and a Liberal MP, Wilfred
Roberts, to Law.
Maude Royden's letter led to considerable discussion in the Foreign Office.
Writing to Eden, on 29 October 1943, she observed:
May I urge that Ethiopia be allowed a representative on the commission . . .
appointed to frame the procedure and indictment against war criminals after
the war. Surely Ethiopia has suffered enough to justify her claiming a place?
Turning to the position of Badoglio, then still Prime Minister of Italy, and
of Emperor Haylä Sellasé, she disarmingly continued:
I understand that it was Badoglio who actually ordered the use of poison-gas
and therefore I can see the delicacy of the situation; on the other hand the
Emperor of Ethiopia is in a no less delicate position with his own people.
His prestige should be enhanced in every possible way, since he is having a
hard row to hoe and doing such a splendid best. We ought not to allow it to
appear that we consider that Ethiopia is so completely under our tutelage
that the Emperor requires no representation on the commission. On the other
hand, that position would certainly enhance his prestige if an Ethiopian
representative, in a case that touches her so nearly, were appointed and
received on exactly the same footing as the representatives of other injured
nations.
The Foreign Office, realising that it was under strong, orchestrated,
criticism, responded immediately by sending Miss Royden a brief
acknowledgment. Written on 4 November, the day after Law's Parliamentary
"inexactitude," it stated that Eden was absent, but that her letter would be
"shown to him on his return." [End Page 99]
This communication constituted no more than a "holding operation." The
Foreign Office was aware that it had to formulate a substantive reply, as
well as to fend off pressure from other supporters of Ethiopia, and doubtless
before long, also from the Ethiopian Government itself. Allen and his
colleagues therefore again formulated their thoughts on Ethiopia's exclusion,
and their justification thereof.
Allen wrote a further lengthy minute, on 10 November. He noted that
supporters of Ethiopian representation "urged that Ethiopia was one of the
first sufferers at the hands of the Axis nations and that many atrocities"
had been "committed against the Ethiopians and on Ethiopian territory by the
Italians." However, he argued, there were still "strong arguments" against
Ethiopian membership. The "chief" of them were that it was 1) "at present
proposed to limit the investigations of the Commission to crimes committed
during the present war"; 2) "it might be difficult to secure the appointment
to the Commission of other members"; and 3) it was "unlikely that an
Ethiopian representative would be in a position to contribute much to the
Commission's proceedings."
These objections, he claimed, "outweigh[ed]" the case for representation. The
British Government should therefore, he urged, maintain its original line,
based on two contentions. Firstly, "the question would be one for decision by
all the Allied Governments represented on the Commission," rather than
Britain alone; secondly, that "the consensus of opinion" (whatever that
meant) was "undoubtedly against Ethiopian representation."
Allen's observations were accepted by another official, Geoffrey Harrison,
who that day wrote a minute in which he more artfully declared: "I agree with
Mr Allen, except that, in view of the great popularity of Ethiopia in certain
circles in this country, I should have thought it preferable that we should
leave the onus for a decision with the Allied Govts. collectively and should
be chary of taking much of a lead ourselves."
MacKereth, of the Egyptian Department, however, took a different view. On the
following day, he pointed to what he considered the immorality of Ethiopia's
exclusion from the Commission, and wrote, with some force:
While I appreciate the inconvenience of having an Ethiopian representative on
the Commission I consider that the moral disadvantage of excluding Ethiopia
outweighs that inconvenience. It seems to me that we create [End Page 100] a
fissure in our case by making a distinction as invidious as this on the
hypothesis (none too sound) that an Ethiopian representative might not
contribute anything useful to the proceedings. The argument that only war
crimes committed since September 1939 (present war) would be more substantial
were China not a party to the commission and had we not brought Ethiopia into
the 'looting' Declaration. The way out suggested by Harrison, i.e. throwing
the onus of exclusion on the honoured 17 already invited seems to me likely
to affect our own prestige for we should thereby let down an ally who,
although no use to us now militarily, was once of considerable assistance
when it came to defeating an Italian army in our rear in North Africa and
since then has done more in the way of providing supplies than some of the
other United Nations.
I am sure that we needlessly put ourselves in the wrong by not asking
Ethiopia to send a representative (we might easily suggest that owing to the
complicated issues involved an 'international lawyer' should be nominated, as
was done when the Abyssinian case came before the League on Nations in
1935/6). I cannot see on what decent grounds the other members of the
commission could object.
These observations prompted Sir Herbert Malkin that day to write a legalistic
minute. In it he declared:
The objection to Ethiopian membership which strikes me as important is as
follows. I do not know whether the Italians committed any 'war crimes'
against Ethiopians during the recent reconquest of Ethiopia, but I imagine
that their [i.e. the Ethiopians'] object in being represented would be to
bring before the Commission the crimes which the Italians undoubtedly
committed during the original conquest of the country. This, however, is
surely out of the question for several reasons, one of which is that probably
the first name on the Ethiopian list would be Marshal Badoglio.
The Marshal was still Italian Prime Minister, and the British Government was
unwilling to break with him.
"The case of Ethiopia," Malkin continued, with some casuistry, was "quite
different . . . from that of China." In the latter case "the only question"
was "how far back to go as regards crimes committed in hostilities which have
been [End Page 101] continually proceeding since the earliest date which it
would be possible to take." Ignoring the Ethiopian Patriots, who had fought
throughout the entire occupation period, he claimed that "in the case of
Ethiopia . . . the crimes were committed in the course of a quite different
war," which had been "followed by a period in which Ethiopia did not exist
internationally at all." He therefore concluded, that, if during the period
prior to September 1939, the Italians committed crimes against Ethiopia, he
did "not see how they could be regarded as 'war crimes.'" 31
After reading the above minutes Roberts drew up a further paper, on 16
November. Summing up the Government position, and repeating arguments of the
above officials, he observed:
Since the announcement was made of the establishment of the United Nations
Commission for the Investigation of War Crimes, the question of Ethiopian
representation upon it has been raised both in questions in the House of
Commons and in letters from Members of Parliament and from well-known
sympathisers of Ethiopia, such as Miss Pankhurst and Miss Maude Royden.
Fortunately, no actual request has been received from the Ethiopian
Government, and we have therefore some time to decide our attitude.
The alternatives seemed to him to be:
1. to invite Ethiopia to serve on the Commission;
2. to make it clear that H.M.G. at least do not regard Ethiopia as being
qualified.
3. to maintain the reserved attitude set out in Mr Hall's statement in the
House of Commons on November 2nd, while clearing our minds regarding our
future attitude if pressure increases.
Considering the case for membership, which was supported by the Foreign
Office's Egyptian Department, i.e., by Mr MacKereth, he wrote:
It is suggested that Ethiopia was one of the first sufferers at the hands of
the Axis nations, that many atrocities were committed against Ethiopia and on
Ethiopian territory by the Italians, and that the inclusion of an [End Page
102] Ethiopian representative would enhance Ethiopia's prestige and have a
useful educative effect. Egyptian Department feel that we needlessly put
ourselves in the wrong by not inviting an Ethiopian representative to
participate. They argue that we thereby lay ourselves open to the charge of
letting down an ally who, although of no use to us now militarily, was once
of considerable assistance in helping to bring about the defeat of an Italian
army in our rear in N. Africa, and has since played her part in providing
supplies. They further point out that, although the Ethiopian Government have
not been brought into our earlier discussions on war crimes, they were
informed at the time of the declaration on looting published last December
and invited to associate themselves with the principles enunciated in it.
Finally, they point out that, while the Commission will in general confine
itself to the examination of war crimes committed since September 1939,
sympathetic consideration has been given to a request from China that
examination should be made of war crimes committed by the Japanese before
that date. This, they feel, might provide a precedent for a similar extension
to cover atrocities committed during the Abyssinian war.
Despite the strength of such contentions Roberts emphasized what he termed
the "strong arguments" against membership. Explaining that this might entail
an Ethiopian demand for the trial of Badoglio (which, though not so stated,
was anathema to the British Government), he declared that, if the Ethiopians
were represented,
their chief object no doubt would be to bring before the Commission the
crimes which the Italians undoubtedly committed during their original
conquest of the country. This probably would mean that the first name on the
Ethiopian list would be Marshal Badoglio.
Like Malkin he saw no need to say more.
Turning to the "parallel with China," he declared that in that case the "only
question" was:
how far back to go as regards crimes committed in hostilities which have been
continually in progress, while in the case of Ethiopia the crimes were
followed by a period in which Ethiopia ceased to exist from the [End Page
103] international point of view. Crimes committed by the Italians during
that period could not properly be regarded as 'war crimes.' An additional
argument against Ethiopian representation is that the Governments concerned,
and in particular the Soviet Government, have always attached importance to
limiting discussions on war crimes to the Allied Governments most directly
concerned with the question. If Ethiopia were admitted, it might be difficult
to refuse requests for admission from other members of the United Nations.
Finally, there is the consideration that an Ethiopian representative would
probably not be able to contribute much to the Commission's proceedings,
although this might be got over by the appointment of a non-Ethiopian
international lawyer to represent them, as was done in the Abyssinian case
that came before the League of Nations in 1935/6.
He then came down firmly in favour of the option of maintaining exclusion,
without either saying so, or explaining why:
It is I think clear that no advantage and considerable embarrassment would
result from including Ethiopia on the Commission and that we should certainly
experience considerable difficulty in persuading many other members of the
Commission to accept her. It is quite logical to rule out from consideration
war crimes committed in the Italian conquest. As regards the Ethiopian
campaign of 1940-41, I have not seen any suggestion that war crimes were
committed by the Italians. In fact, probably the Italians were the victims
more often than the perpetrators of atrocities during this campaign. In any
case the position in regard to this is set out by the first sentence of Mr
Hall's statement of November 2nd.
Hall observed that the commission might be prepared to consider information
submitted by the Ethiopian Government "regarding crimes committed against
their nationals by our common enemies during the course of the present war."
Roberts accordingly recommended that the Government should state, "in reply
to inquiries, that 'all questions relating to the constitution and functions
of the United Nations Commission are matters for all the Allied Governments
represented thereon, and not for H[is] M[ajesy's] G[overnment] alone to
decide.'" [End Page 104]
The argument that Ethiopian membership was a matter for the Allied
Governments as a whole, rather than for the British Government alone, was to
be repeated by the Foreign Office on many occasions. There is, however, no
evidence that the British ever attempted to consult those governments, let
alone that they ever proposed their acceptance of Ethiopian representation.
The exclusion of Ethiopia did not, however, go entirely unchallenged in the
Foreign Office. Sir Orme Sarjent questioned the whole case on 19 November in
a minute declaring:
I wonder whether it is really advisable to continue to adopt the attitude
that Ethiopia is not to be included in the Commission. Having agreed, as I
understand, that the Government of every Allied country which has been
occupied by the enemy is entitled to be represented on the Committee, I
cannot see how we can exclude Ethiopia. It is really no answer to say that if
they were to be included the Ethiopian representative would be inadequate or
that he would bring up cases which were not covered by the Commission's terms
of reference. Obviously if he did his cases would be ruled out. Nor do I see
how we can base our refusal on the argument that we do not think that the
Italians committed any war crimes during the 1940/41 campaign. It is surely
for the Commission to judge of that in the light of the evidence, if any,
which is submitted to it.
Notwithstanding this dissent he added a "PS," declaring that he supposed: "we
must continue for the present the line we have adopted up till now." 32
Roberts accordingly despatched a letter to Miss Royden, on 24 November.
Referring to inquiry about the appointment of an Ethiopian representative, he
declared:
As you will be aware this question has recently been raised in the House of
Commons. The position is as stated in the reply given by the Parliamentary
Secretary for Foreign Affairs to Mr Creech Jones on the 2nd November, of
which a copy is enclosed. You will of course realize that questions relating
to the constitution and functions of the United Nations Commission are
matters for all the Allied Governments represented thereon and not for His
Majesty's Government alone to decide. 33 [End Page 105]
The Foreign Office thus at last openly committed itself to Ethiopia's
exclusion. The issue of Italian war crimes in Ethiopia could not, however, be
so easily suppressed.
First Talks in Addis Ababa
The question of Italian war crimes was raised six weeks later in a brief
conversation, in mid-January 1944, between Robert Howe, the British Minister
in Addis Ababa, and the Ethiopian Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ato Ambay
Wäldä Maryam. No minutes of the conversation seem extant, but their
differences were so great that the matter was "allowed to drop." 34
The Fall of Badoglio
British opposition to Ethiopian membership of the commission owed much, as we
have seen, to fear that the Ethiopian Government would bring charges against
Badoglio, whom the British Government desired to retain as Italian Prime
Minister. This consideration lost much of its weight in the summer of 1944,
as a result of events in Italy itself. On 4 June, Rome fell to the British
and Americans, and Badoglio, whose influence had been decreasing, resigned
five days later. He was replaced by Ivanoe Bonomi, an elderly socialist.
Despite the fall of Badoglio, the British continued to afford him unreserved
support. When it seemed for example that the Bonomi Government was to arrest
him, Prime Minister Churchill despatched a "Personal and Top Secret"
telegram, on 8 December 1944, to Sir Noel Charles, the British Ambassador in
Rome. It declared:
You are responsible for the Marshal's safety and sanctuary in the British
Embassy or in some equally safe place to which he can be removed. It must be
remembered that he has signed a treaty with General Eisenhower and also
documents with Admiral Cunningham which involve the honour of the British
Government. A man who has signed such documents could only be brought to
trial by the conquered Italians with the approval of the United States and
United Kingdom Governments . . . you are not to let him go into any danger or
pass out of our safeguarding hands until we have given full directions on the
matter . . . military honour is also involved on [End Page 106] account of
the high Generals and Admirals with whom he has dealt so faithfully. I repeat
you are responsible for his honourable security. 35
This letter leads us to suppose that the British Government, which sought to
protect Badoglio from his own Government, would not allow him to be tried for
crimes committed, half a decade earlier, in far-off Ethiopia.
Revelations in the New York Times
Interest in Italian war crimes was minimal throughout 1944. Britain and its
European allies, primarily interested in the question of German war crimes,
awaited the successful termination of the conflict in Europe, in 1945, before
instituting trials. The Ethiopian Government, under strict British control
imposed by the Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty of 31 January 1942, was necessarily
also fairly inactive. The country did not regain freedom of action until the
second Anglo-Ethiopian agreement, on 19 December 1944.
Though unable to take much action while under British control, some members
of the Ethiopian Government were seething with anger over the war crimes
issue. This found expression in an article, in the New York Times, on 31
January 1945. Its author, Sydney Gruson, had apparently been in contact with
the Ethiopian Legation in London. He reported that the Ethiopian authorities
were complaining of "British refusal to hand over Italians and others guilty
of war-crimes," and referred specifically to Mussolini, Badoglio, and the
Emperor's collaborationist son-in-law Haylä Sellasé Gugsa. 36
Gruson's article, which seemed likely to interest America's pro-Ethiopian
Black community, was considered so sensitive by the British Embassy in
Washington that the ambassador, the Earl of Halifax, that day sent a
"Secret" telegram to the Foreign Office. After summarising Gruson's charges,
he wrote: "Could you please supply me as rapidly as possible with the
facts." 37
The Foreign Office, replying on 6 February, reverted to its old arguments. It
contended that the commission's terms of reference were "confined to crimes
committed by our enemies during the present war." It nevertheless added, for
Halifax's "own information," i.e., not for disclosure to the Americans, the
delicate matter that the commission's responsibility might be extended "in
the case of China to the beginning of hostilities against Japan." [End Page
107]
Outlining Foreign Office policy, designed to exclude Ethiopia, the letter
continued:
Representation on the Commission has . . . , for practical purposes, been
confined to the Four Major Allies, the Dominions and European exiled
governments, though this of course would not prevent its considering any
information within its terms of reference which any United Nations
Government, including Ethiopia, might wish to submit to it. There is,
however, no logical ground for extension of activities of this United Nations
body to investigation of crimes committed during the Italo-Abyssinian war or
subsequent period down to the outbreak of the present war. Such extension
would seem to involve consideration by the Commission of crimes committed
during all previous warlike operations by our enemies, which is clearly
inadmissible.
The Foreign Office concluded by arguing that any extension of the period
covered by the commission would "require consent, not only of His Majesty's
Government, but also of all the other Governments represented on the
Commission, who would not in fact be likely to agree." 38
The Pamphlet Italy's War Crimes in Ethiopia
The question of Italian atrocities acquired new focus two months later, in
mid-April, when New Times and Ethiopia News in London published the pamphlet
Italy's War Crimes in Ethiopia. It contained excerpts from reports of the
Graziani massacre, and photographs of executions, taken by the fascists
themselves, found in Ethiopia after the Liberation. The pamphlet was widely
circulated, to British MPs and others, and was almost immediately reprinted.
39
The London Agreement, Ethiopian Accession thereto, and the Ethiopian War
Crimes Commission
With the end of World War II, in the summer of 1945, interest in war crimes
came at last to the fore. On 20 June, the Foreign Office, though still trying
to shield Badoglio and opposing the trial of Italians for crimes in Ethiopia,
drew up a revealing "Biography of Graziani." It noted that in the Addis Ababa
massacre [End Page 108] associated with his name "several thousand
Abyssinians, men, women, and children, were slaughtered," and added:
"Blackshirts armed with rifles, pistols, bombs and flame-throwers, were
turned loose on the natives and an appalling massacre was carried out for
three days." 40
Two months later, on 8 August, Britain and the principal Allies signed the
London Agreement, for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War
Criminals of the European Axis. As a result of this agreement an
International Military Tribunal was set up for trial and punishment of
suspected war criminals. 41
News of this soon reached Addis Ababa. Less than two months later, on 3
October, the Ethiopian Government announced its adherence to the agreement,
the eighth country to do so. Not long after this, on 20 May 1946, an
Ethiopian War Crimes Commission was appointed, by Ethiopian Imperial Order
No. 1784. 42
Negotiations for an Italian Peace Treaty, 1946
The ending of the European war had meanwhile hastened the need for a Peace
Treaty between Italy and the United Nations, and for resolution of the war
crimes issue. The Foreign Ministers of the Four Great Powers, the UK, France,
the USSR, and the USA, started preliminary discussions on the matter, in
Paris, in the early summer of 1946.
Ethiopia, like other Allies, was allowed to make recommendations for
inclusion in the Treaty. Acting on the advice of its American adviser,
Professor John H. Spencer, and displaying considerable ability, the Ethiopian
delegation pressed the Council to agree to two imp |
